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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
VALLEY SHOPPING CENTER NO. 3,
a corporation, AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation and
SAFECO INSURANCE COMPANY, a
corporation,
Respondents-Plaintiffs

vs.
SUMNER J. HATCH and ROBERT M.
McRAE,

Case No.
11188

Appellants-Defendants

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The plaintiffs-respondents represent the interests of
those who were robbed of about $2500.00 cash. Plaintiffs
contend that the defendants-appellants, as attorneys for the
robbers, obtained the stolen cash from their clienrts with
notice that it was loot.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to a jury who unanimously found
that defendants obtained $2,115.40 with notice that it was
loot.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs seek affirmance of the verdict and judgment
below.

ST A TEMENT OF FACTS
Defendants' statement of facts requires some elaboration.
'I'he grocery store, on 1st South and 7th East, was robbed by two (3) armed and masked men at about 8:50 p.m.
on December 19, 1964 (R. 98). The police, store personnel
and insurer of the store investigated the loss and determined the loss at aproximately $2,431.37 (R. 120, 175, 301,
Ex. P-1).
Within a few hours of the robbery, police apprehended
and arrested Wayne Johnson and George Stockton at the
latter's residence, a few blocks from the store. There the
officers found the following:
A cardboard box marked "Valley No. 7" in the basement (R. 129, 164, 165)
$124.00 in currency and rolled coins in the bottom of
a clothes hamper filled with dirty clothes (R.
130, 131, 162)
$10.00 cash in rolled dimes and $2.00 in rolled
nickles under a plastic doll (R. 131)
$320.00 in $20 bills in a closet on a shelf (R. 132)
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About $790.00, consisting of 100-$1 bills, 25-$5's, 19$10's and 7-$20's, and rolls of nickles, dimes
and quarters, 1921 and 1891 silver dollars, and
16 Kennedy half dollars, all in a suitcase on the
back porch (R. 133, 134, 163, 164)
A new $1 bill under edge of buffet (R. 133)
A torn wrapper used for $100 bills (R. 163)
1 pair of black and 1 pair of red leather gloves (R.
133)
2 automatic pistols, one of which was loaded (R.
129, 133)
At the police station $320.00 or $332.00 was taken from
the person of Wayne Johnson (R. 140, 141, 145).
Workman was arrested upon information obtained
from Stockton (R. 138, 167).
Robbery charges were filed against Johnson, Stockton
and Workman (R. 187, 203, 204, 210, 276).
The next evening Stockton took the officers to the
apartment of his daughter at 720 - 2nd A venue, also just a
few blocks from the store and from Stockton's residence,
where another $550.00 in $20 bills was obtained (R. 165,
212, 213, 305,306, 307)
All of the aforedescribed money, totaling approximately $2117.00, was itemized and placed as evidence in the evidence room of the Salt Lake City Police Department in connection with the robbery case (R. 135, 144, 167, 168).
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Johnson, Stockton and Workman were interrogated
and subjected to a line-up (R. 166, 167, 172, 173). A comprehensive written report of the incident was filed by Detective Nicholson (R. 142, 144).
Workman plead guiity to the robbery (R. 155). However, the robbery charges against Stockton and Johnson
were ultimately dismissed because Stockton had his probation revoked and Johnson plead guilty to still another robbery charge (R. 152).
At the time of the robbery Johnson was being sought
by the police all over the country (R. 169, 184, 261). Johnson had no gainful employment immediately before the robbery (R. 184). Stockton had not worked since 1960 (R. 201).
Johnson, Stockton and Workman had made their initial associations at the State Prison (R. 199, 207).
Stockton retained Attorney McRae, who ascertained
that Stockton was held on probation violation charges and
potential charges of forgery, robbery and burglary (R. 231,
232. 243, 269, 270, 271, 272), McRae was aware the money
was impounded in evidence and recognized the possibility
that it belonged to someone besides Stockton (R. 243).
McRae did not diligently look into the ownership of the
money (R. 240, 255). McRae knew that the Kennedy half
dollars and the old silver dollars were picked up at Stockton's home (R. 241, 242).
Wayne Johnson retained defendant Hatch, who asked
Johnson "questions" when they first consulted (R. 195).
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Hatch and McRae, who were engaged in a joint venture
in the criminal defense work (R. 225), obtained assignments from Johnson and Stockton of all their interest in
the monies in the evidence room (R. 211, 212, 234).
Defendants knew the investigating detectives by their
first names (R. 151, 226) and thus probed them for information (R. 241, 143, 152, 173, 174, 315). Defendants knew
the police were pushing the robbery charges (R. 241, 260),
and knew they could get police records (R. 150, 170). Without notice to the robbery victims (R. 282) defendants obtained court orders from City Judge Horace Beck releasing
about $2,160.22 of the currency and rolled coins from the
evidence room to defendants between December 29, 1964
and January 19, 1965 (R. 237, 238, 239). Before the latter
date Johnson was charged with another robbery (R. 292).
The defendant attorneys apparently relied on technicalities
of identifying the money to obtain the court orders (R. 240,
244, 274, 280, 290). The County Attorney's office essentially
offered the same proof had on the instant trial and vigorously resisted the orders (R. 250, 264, 278, 285). However,
defendants did not seek the silver dollars or the Kennedy
half dollars (R. 239, 241, 242, 294).
At the instant trial Johnson, Workman and Stockton
testified. Johnson and Workman were prison inmates at
that time (R. 182, 207). All three of them gave pertinent
testimony and on occasion took the Fifth Amendment (R.
208, 211, 213). Mrs. Stockton could not recall anything and
"knew" nothing (R. 197, 198).
Stockton testified that he had never had $1,000 cash in
his home (R. 211). Yet in an assignment to Attorneys Mc-
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Rae and Hatch, Stockton assigned all of his interest in the
money found at his residence and his daughter's (about
$1800.00) (R. 212).
Although Johnson gave an assignment of his interest
in the monies picked up at Stockton's home, Johnson refusec~ to state whether he claimed some interest in those
monies, on the ground that it might tend to incriminate him
(R. 188-192, 287, 288, Ex. D-2).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY ON THE APPLICABLE
STANDARD OF LAW
The court instructed that the defendants had "no obligation to make an independent inquiry as to the ownership of the funds they may receive from their clients, unless
they had sufficient notice prior to the receipt of same, to
put a reasonable and prudent man on inquiry to avoid taking funds belonging to someone else. Information that
would put a reasonable, prudent man on such an inquiry
as to the ownership of the funds would constitute the notice
referred to in proposition No. 2 of the verdit (R. 65, Instr.
9B).
The jury found that the defendants received the money
with "notice or knowledge that it had been stolen" (R. 55,
Prop. No. 2).
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Defendants' own requested instruction No. 4 (R. 60),
(essentially adopted by the court in its instructions Nos.
9A, B, and C) provided that the defendants had no obligation to make an independent inquiry as to the source of the
funds "if they had no clear or convincing evidence to the
contrary."
36 Am. Jur., Money §6, cited by defendants, describes
good faith as "without notice or knowledge of its tainted
character" and goes on to say:

"The authorities are agreed that it is not sufficient
that the receiver of stolen money act in good faith
and without notice of its tainted character; he must
also have parted with a valuable consideration
therefor; and hence, if he is a mere depository for
the thief, the money may be recovered from him;
or if he parts with it after notice that it was stolen
money, he will be liable to the true owner therefor ...
"It is said that at the present time there is substantially no difference in the rule applicable to the
rights of a person receiving stolen money and receiving stolen negotiable instruments which are
complete on their face ..."

Although there is some confusion even under negotiable instruments law, it is submitted that the folowing authorities are in accord with the instructions of the court in
the instant case:
"If circumstances exist as to the purchase of stolen
paper which are calculated to raise suspicion in the
mind of an ordinary man of prudence and discretion,
such a purchaser will be prevented from acquiring
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title better than that of his vendor." 8 Am. Jur.,
Bills and Notes, §619, pp. 332-333
In 11 Am. Jur. 2d, Bills and Notes §§425 et seq., even
the discussion of the subjective test ultimately falls back on
a discussion of objective standards: "Knowledge of facts
which render the taking dishonest" or "facts known to the
taker ... such as to reasonably form the basis for an inference that in acquiring the instrument with knowledge of
such facts, he acted in dishonest regard of the rights of
(others)."
In 10 C.J.S., Bills and Notes §323, it states:
"If a party has knowledge of facts or circumstances
involved in the negotiation of a note, the legal effect
of which would avoid the transfer to him, he cannot
claim as a holder in due course, no matter how honestly he may have believed that the law would sustain the transfer."

In First National Bank v. Trebin, (Ohio) 52 N.E. 834,
we find:
"Good faith is not measured by a man's own standard of right, but by a standard for the observance
of all men in their dealings with one another."
In Ward v. City Trust, (NY) 84 N.E. 585, it states:
"One who suspects, or ought to suspect, is bound to
inquire, and the law presumes that he knows whatever proper inquiry would disclose."
When the defendants had knowledge that the money
was impounded as evidence in the robbery case, such is
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equivalent to a person taking a negotiable instrument
which is altered and irregular on its face. In such a case
there is a duty to inquire and discover the facts which a
prudent purchaser would discover. See 11 Am. Jur. 2d Bills
and Notes, §448.
In Sinclair v. Houston, (Texas) 268 SW2d 290, cited in
defendant's brief, the court reaffirmed that it is against
public policy to protect a gambler who has won stolen
money. In the instant case it is clearly against the public
interest to permit the loot to be used to the advantage of the
robbers in their own defense of that very robbery.
Also in Sinclair v. Houston, the court apparently approved an objective standard by stating that it is "unnecessary to determine whether the evidence would have supported a finding that the appellee, in the exercise of reasonable care, would have concluded from the heavy losses sustained by an assistant treasurer ... that he was not losing
his own money."
At trial the defendants should have had, but did not
have, the burden of proving their good faith and lack of
notice or knowledge, once it was established that the money
belonged to the plaintiffs or had infirmities.
In Warren v. Smith 35 Ut. 455, 100 P.1069, the court
stated:
"It is also well settled that when the loss by the

original owner or the theft from him is proven, the
burden of proof shifts, and the holder must show
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that he acquired it bona fide for value and before
maturity, or from someone who had a perfect title."
See also Idaho State Bank v. Hooper Sugar, 74 Ut. 24,
276 P.659; Lembo v. Federici, (Wash.) 385 P2d 312; and 12
Am. Jur. 2d, Bills and Notes, §1204.
In National Bank v. Price, 65 Ut. 57, 234 P. 231, the
court quoted at pages 240 <md 241:
"It is ordinarily to be expected in these cases that
the purchaser will testify to his good faith and want
of notice and that defendant is compelled to rely
upon circumstantial evidence to rebut such showing. Whether plaintiff has sufficiently sustained the
burden resting upon him and made good his claim
to be an innocent purchaser is therefore a question
for the jury . . . A categorical denial of notice or
knowledge is something which in many, if not in
most, instances cannot be opposed by direct proof;
and the credibilily of the witnesses, their interest in
the case, the reasonableness or unreasonableness of
their statements, the time, place and manner of the
transaction, its conformity to or departure from the
ordinary methods of business, and all other facts
and circumstances which, though of slight moment
in themselves, yet when taken together give character and color to the purchase under inquiry, ...
(O)bserving this principle, it has frequently been
held that a denial of notice by the purchaser, though
he be uncontradicted by any other witness, is not
sufficient to justify a directed verdict in his favor."
In USF&G v. Eades, (W.Va.) 144 S.E.2d, p. 709, the
court stated:
"A purchaser (of negotiable instrument) takes with
notice only where he has actual knowledge or
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knowledge of facts which make it bad faith on his
part not to inquire or discover evidence of inequities, and certain facts or circumstances may or may
not constitute notice, actual or imputed because of
the failure to inquire."
In any event, whether the duty to inquire be discussed in terms of subjectivity or objectivity, the evidence
is without dispute in this case that the defendants, in spite
of any real inquiry, did, in fact have notice and knowledge
that the money was loot. The defendants did not, and could
never, under the circumstances, meet the burden of showing their innocence and good faith.
Even the Kelly Kar case, cited by plaintiff in his brief,
(298 P2d 590,) states:
"So long as he buys in good faith and exercises all
the precautions as to title that the reasonable man
would exercise, and so long as he is not put on notice ... the transaction was valid. . . . (I )f he was
put on such notice as a reasonably prudent man
would have interpreted to be tantamount to a declaration by the thief that the chattel had been purchased with stolen money, he cannot retain the
movable against the innocent victim of the robbery."
10 C.J.S., Bills and Notes, §324, pp. 820 and 821, states:
"It would seem that what might be bad faith on the
part of one person engaged in one occupation because of his failure to make inquiry, might not be
bad faith on the part of a person engaged in another
occupation."
Attorneys are required to act as reasonable, prudent
men, particularly where their own interests are competing
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with their client's interests and the interests of third parties, such as the victims of a robbery, law enforcement
agencies and the public.

POINT II
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN JUDGMENT AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS AS A MATTER OF LAW AND AS A MATTER OF FACT
In a nearly identical case of McKinley v. Smith, (Calif.)
17 P2d 1032, involving an attorney plaintiff, the court said:
"The record further shows that at the time that the
plaintiff presented his assignment signed by Russell Hill, purporting to transfer the ownership of
the money in question from Russell Hill to the
plaintiff, the plaintiff specifically excepted in his demand upon the chief of police the turning over and
delivery to him of the $10 bill of which bank had
the serial number, and taken from the possession of
Russell Hill. Why the plaintiff did not want all of
the money is sufficiently apparent from what we
have said, and needs no further comment.
"The record further shows that at the time of the
assignment upon which the plaintiff bases his right
of action, and prior thereto, he knew that Russell
Hill was confined in the county jail of the county of
Stanislaus, in the city of Modesto, charged with robbing the Modesto Branch of the American Trust
Company. This fixes the fact that the plaintiff is
not in the position of an innocent holder, and took
no better title than that possessed by Russell Hill,
the man identified, beyond any reasonably controversy, as the one who held up the bank.
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"In addition to what we have said, the record shows
that Russell Hill was arrested in St. Joseph, Mo.,
about two weeks after the robbery of the bank in
Modesto. The marked $10 bill had not been paid out
to any other person, and it could not have come into
the possession of Russell Hill unless he were the one
who had robbed the bank, or had obtained the bill
from someone who had robbed the bank. The record
being practically incontrovertible that Russell Hill
was the one who robbed the bank, the jury could
not reasonably have come to any other conclusion
than that Russell Hill was the person who robbed
the bank, obtained possession of the marked bill,
and took it with him with the other moneys found in
his possession, to St. Joseph, Mo. Under these circumstances no jury could reasonably come to any
other conclusion than that Russell Hill was the one
who robbed the bank of the bank of the $1548, and
still had in his possession, as a part thereof, the currency which was found upon him at the time of his
arrest.
"(T)he jury had a right to take into consideration as
to where Russell Hill had obtained the money when
he was asked by the chief of police if he had anything to say, and he replied, 'I ain't saying anything.' No one who had obtained the money honestly would have made such an answer. After the
bank had been robbed the insurance carrier of the
bank, took an assignment of the bank's claim, was
allowed to intervene herein, and was found by the
jury to be the owner of the money involved in this
action.
"In view of the foregoing, we do not deem it necessary to enter into any technical discussion of the
instruction given by the trial court to the jury, nor
of the requested instructions that were refused, further than to say that a reading of the instructions
shows that the jury was fairly and fully instructed,
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and that no error is disclosed sufficient ot warrant
any reversal, if error there be.
"We do not deem it necessary to cite any authorities
in this case, as what we have said, as disclosed by
the record, is sufficient to satisfy any reasonable
man that the money involved herein was a part of
the currency stolen by Russell Hill, from the bank
in Modesto, and that anyone taking an assignment
from him, with knowledge, would acquire no title."

Stiller v. Rogers, (Calif.) 159 P.456, is in the same context. There a woman stole $900. At the time of her arrest
the police found $501 on her person which was deposited
with the sheriff. Most of the money was in $50 bills. Thereafter, her attorney received a written order upon the sheriff
to pay $200 of the deposited moneys as attorneys' fees.
After some resistance by the sheriff, the money was turned
over to the attorney. In affirming the trial court, the appellate court found that the defendant either "knew or
should have known that at least part of the money so received by him were stolen funds .... "and stated:
"In accepting employment ... he must have known
that she was charged with the theft ... from the
plaintiff .... (H)e knew from both her and the sheriff that a considerable sum had been found on her
person at her arrest and had been impounded ...
"Such facts would seem to deprive the defendant of
the benefit of receiving the assignment of the currency ... as being one who paid value therefor in
good faith, without notice of the theft of such
money."
"A purchaser ... cannot shut his eyes to the surrounding circumstances, and where the circumstances are so cogent and obvious that to remain
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passive would constitute bad faith or as such is to
justify the conclusion that failure to make such inquiry arose from a suspicion that inquiry would discluse a vice or defect in the instrument of transaction, such purchaser is charged with knowledge. Intentional ignorance, such as a wilful evasion of
knowledge of the facts, constitutes bad faith disqualifying the purchaser from becoming a holder in
due course. Where circumstances which put him on

inquiry are within his knowledge, he is chargeable
with knowledge of all facts which an inquiry would
have revealed."

In Hindnwrch v. Hoffman, (Pa.) 18 A. 14, the thief gave
$1400 loot to the defendant to hold, the defendant not then
being aware that it was loot. Later, the defendant was advised by plaintiff's attorney that the plaintiff claimed the
money. Thereafter, the defendant paid the money on order
of the thief to a third party. The court held as a matter of
law that "under these circumstances, it was clearly his duty
to hold it for plaintiff .... Justice demands that he should
now be compelled to pay the amount to the rightful owner."
In Bergheim v. McRae, (Minn.) 252 NW 833, plaintiff,
as the owner of a note, assigned the note to the bank cashier
personally. The cashier (McRae) embezzled the money
from the bank and then endorsed the note to the defendant
Simon. Affirming the judgment for the plaintiff, the court
stated:
"The trial court found that Simon acquired the note .
. . . with knowledge of such circumstances that he
acted in bad faith ... It found that Simon knew
that McRae was in financial difficulties and that he
had embezzled money from the bank and was endeavoring to borrow to make up the shortage. He
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knew that McRae was menaced with criminal prosecutions and ... with all other.... circumstances .
. . . were sufficient to constitute red lights ahead and
to cast upon ... defendant .... Simon the duty to
make inquiries .... The neglect to make inquiry ....
was more than mere negligence. It was lack of commercial faith. The inquiry most naturally should
have been directed to the mortgagee (plaintiff). It
is contended that inasmuch as the appellant discussed the matter with McRae, his banker and with
the attorney for the bank, he did everything that an
honest man should. The record is necessarily silent
as to what was submitted to the lawyer, and McRae
was the very man whose title should have been
scrutinized . . . . Men of business experience know
that hard-pressed debtors turn sharp corners and
are not scrupulous to distinguish between their own
and the property of others .... Knowledge, not surmise suspicion or fear is necessary. Not knowledge
of the exact truth, but knowledge of some truth
that would prevent action by those commercially
honest men for whom law is made."
In Lytle v. Lansing, 147 U.S. 59, the court commented:
"It is incredible that a man should purchase this
large amount of bonds ($50,000) for half their base
value without looking at them or even noticing
whether they were signed or sealed, without making any inquiries with regard to the responsibility
of the town, or the circumstances under which the
bonds were issued, the non-payment of the overdue
coupons, or the title of the person (to him an entire
stranger) through whom he purchased them . . . .
(T)he very fact that bonds were offered for sale at
this large discount, at a place 2,000 miles from
where they were issued, was of itself a circumstance
calculated to arouse suspicion of their validity in
the mind of any person of ordinary intelligence."
"It is singular as a matter of fact and fatal to a recovery as a matter of law that the plaintiff did not
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act upon the information thus received and at once
repudiate the transaction and refuse to consummate
the sale by a deed.
"While the notice received by the plaintiff may not
have gone to the extent of informing him of the particular facts showing the invalidity of the bonds, he
was informed that the town was contesting its liability, and that Breckenridge himself was in litigation with it over the payment of the coupons. Receiving this information as he did, not only from his
vendor, but from his own attorneys from whom he
could have learned all the facts by inquiry, it is
mere quibbling to say that he had no notice that the
bonds were invalid. While purchasers of negotiable
securities are not chargeable with constructive notice of the pendency of a suit affecting the title or
validity of the securities, it has never been doubted .
. . . that those who buy such securities from litigating parties with actual notice of a suit, do so at their
peril, and must abide the result the same as the
parties from whom they got their title. Under the
circumstances it was bad faitb. or wilful ignorance
... to forebear making further inquiries .... No rule
of law protects a purchaser who wilfully closes his
ears to information, or refuses to make inquiry
when circumstances of grave suspicion impair it."
11 Am. Jur. 2d, Bills and Notes §422, at page 478,
states:
"The fact that the holder knew that his transferor
was an emblezzler or thief and was charged or expected to be charged with crime is sufficient to put
him on inquiry and establish his bad faith where he
makes no inquiry as to title to an instrument which
he takes."
It is difficult to imagine that the defendants did not in-
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quire directly of their clients concerning the robbery. However, at trial both the defendants and their clients claimed
privilege as far as their discussions of the robbery (R. 290).
The only inference to be drawn is that the attorneys were
told something by their clients which, if disclosed, would
tend to involve their clients in the robbery and loot.
The only explanation Johnson gave was that the
money the police took from him ($320.00) was won gambling (R. 184-189). Yet, Johnson assigned $1,000 to the defendants (R. 288, Exh. 2).
Likewise, Stockton failed to give any plausible explanation of his interest in any sum such as $1,000 or more.
Even if it be assumed that the robbers told the defendants that part of the moneys impounded were from a source
other than the robbery, can a reasonable man let alone an
attorney be permitted to take money under those circumstances without inquiring of the robbery victims?
The proceedings before Judge Beck in no way could
have determined title to the monies, since none of the alleged principals involved in title (the robbery victims and
Stockton and Johnson) appeared as parties or witnesses.
Apparently only technicalities were discussed by the attorneys who were involved in the criminal proceedings
against Stockton and Johnson.
Why did defendants leave the silver dollars and Kennedy half dollars in the evidence room, unless they realized
that such was loot?
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There is no dispute in the evidence but that before
taking the money the defendants knew:
1. That a robbery had taken place involving a few
thousand dollars.
2. Their clients were charged with that robbery.
3. Money, in the form of bills and rolled coins, specific silver dollars and half dollars, was held as evidence
and loot in connection with the robbery.
4. Although their clients were strangers, they had
criminal records and no apparent legitimate source of such
sums.
5. The police and county attorney's office resisted defendants taking the money.
6. The victims of the robbery had no opportunity to
protect their interests.
7. Workman plead guilty to the charge of robbery.
(Note: State v. Workman, 20 Ut. 2d 178, 435 P2d 919).
The defendants were in the position of having the
knowledge or being able readily to obtain the knowledge
apparent in the instant trial.
As a matter of law defendants had notice and knowledge of the tainted character of the money and of the infirmities of their clients' title.
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POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING
JOHNSON IN CONTEMPT IN THE PRESENCE
OF THE JURY, AND SUCH ACTION WAS NOT
PREJUDICIAL ERROR
Section 78-32-3, Utah Code Annotated 1953, provides
for summary punishment of contempt committed in the immediate presence of the court.
This is in accord with 53 Am. Jur., Trials, §81:
"During a trial and ini the presence of a jury the
trial court may cause the arrest and punishment of
a contumatious witness .... "
The court's contempt finding added nothing to the effect already created by Johnson in identifying himself as
a convict and refusing to answer relevant questions.

POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMITTING RESPONDENT'S COUNSEL TO CALL
JOHNSON AND STOCKTON AFTER HAVING
BEEN ADVISED THAT THEY WOULD INVOKE
A PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
In the instant case Stockton and Johnson did testify,
despite occasional resort to the Fifth Amendment (R. 195,
203, 206). The court gave cautionary instructions to the
jury. (R. 195, 203, 206).
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In Girrard v. Young, 20 Ut.2d 30, 432 P2d 343, the entire court agreed that:
"In a civil case where a party invokes the Fifth
Amendment privilege, it is a circumstance which
upon a trial the court or jury may consider in connection with all other evidence and may draw an
inference adverse to that party's interest if they so
desire."
The cases cited in plaintiff's brief are otherwise criminal in nature and not apropos.

POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO DECLARE A MISTRIAL ON RESPONDENT'S OPENING STATEMENT ALLUDING TO
CONFESSIONS, WHICH IN ANY EVENT WAS
NOT PREJUDICIAL
It is plaintiff's position that the confessions of Johnson

and Stockton were admissible for the purpose of showing
what information would have been available to the defendants if they had made reasonable inquiry, but not for
the purpose of establishing the truth of such confessions.
Accordingly, plaintiffs made an offer of proof consistent
with the opening statement (R. 265).
Under such circumstances the discretion of the trial
court in refusing to grant a mistrial was entirely appropriate. See Miller v. Braun, (Kans.) 411 P2d 621, and 88 C.J.S.,
Trials, §161.
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POINT VI
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS RULINGS ON EVIDENCE
A. The testimony of Mr. Reese with respect to the loss
paid by the insurance company was entirely compatible
with establishing the extent of the interest of the insurance
company in the lawsuit. The exhibit was nothing more
than confirmation of the payment actually made by the
insurance company.
B. The testimony of District Attorney Banks was most
objective. He did not really answer the allegedly objectionable question put to him, but merely stated that which
was obvious to everybody.
"And if you could tie the money itself, by identity,
or identify the individuals, either way, and the
amounts were the same, if all of those existed, then
that all would be a circumstance that would point
toward being involved in the robbery." (R. 318)
Under direct examination Mr. Banks discussed what
he understood to be the normal practice of criminal defense
counsel in obtaining information. The cross-examination
by plaintiffs was germaine to the state of mind of an attorney under the circumstances. 'tt was within the proper
discretion of the trial court. See Stagmeyer v. Leatham, 20
Ut 2d 421, 439 P2d 279.
CONCLUSION
The defendants, as a matter of law, had notice that the
money they obtained had infirmities in their clients'
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claimed title to even a part of the monies. In any event, the
case was fairly submitted to the jury which could not reasonably have come to any other conclusion than that the defendants took the money with notice of its infirmities. Although there were many complicated details involved, the
substance of the case was clear and without dispute. Rulings on various minor details were of little moment and not
prejudicial to defendants.
Respectfully submitted,
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN

JAY E. JENSEN
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